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Abstract
The appointment of  a new United Nations (UN) Secretary-General brings new opportuni-
ties to address issues that have beset the organization over recent decades. A priority in that 
regard should be accountability for harms caused within peacekeeping. This issue has received 
significant attention over recent years, with the close scrutiny of  cholera in Haiti and lead poi-
soning in Kosovo being just two examples. While legal scholarship in recent years has focused 
on how to reform UN accountability, particularly in relation to the Haiti cholera claims, 
there have been fewer proposals on how to address crimes committed by UN peacekeepers. 
One of  the most serious of  those crimes, in terms of  harms caused both to victims and to the 
legitimacy of  UN peacekeeping operations, is sexual abuse. Yet the proposals for addressing 
this issue largely have not been successful. To that end, this article – which is exploratory in 
nature – sets out why there is a need for a wholesale reform of  how we approach accountabil-
ity for peacekeepers who perpetrate sexual abuse, explaining particularly how the problems 
relate to laws and normative frameworks as well as to investigations and prosecutions. The 
article then proposes elements that might be considered in a new victim-centred approach – 
namely, criminal justice, truth and reconciliation, human rights and political processes.
1 Introduction
The need for stronger and more transparent accountability structures for interna-
tional organizations and their personnel is a subject that has been explored extensively. 
* Professor of  Law, Conflict and Global Development, University of  Reading, United Kingdom. Email: 
r.a.freedman@reading.ac.uk. Parts of  this research have been funded by the Arts and Humanities 
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Many legal commentators have focused on the gaps created when international orga-
nizations fulfil functions previously undertaken by states yet do so without consid-
ering accountability structures to address harms caused during those activities. The 
increasing role of  international organizations externally (as opposed to being fora for 
member states) and the multiplicity of  actors involved in many activities has given rise 
to tensions around responsibility and accountability that, for the most part, remain 
unresolved within doctrinal scholarship.1
Whether international organizations are assuming the roles or functions of  states 
or, indeed, have become a form of  global government, traditional accountability 
structures provide little opportunity for challenging their decisions or seeking 
accountability when harms are caused. One concerning consequence of  this is 
that there are few opportunities for individuals to hold accountable international 
organizations, despite those institutions having a direct impact on their lives.2 
Individuals, therefore, frequently must rely upon states to intervene in such 
circumstances, something that many states are either incapable or unwilling to do.3 
The problem, however, goes beyond the  accountability of  the organizations and further 
includes the accountability of  individuals who act on behalf  of  those institutions. It has 
been insisted by some scholars that no individual within international institutions is 
held responsible for action or inaction that leads to grave harms. A typical example of  
1 The primary concern of  this article is accountability, not responsibility. That being said, responsibility 
remains relevant to this topic. For more on responsibility of  international organizations, particularly 
the United Nations, see, e.g., International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of  
International Organisations’ (2011), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/
draft_articles/9_11_2011.pdf; Möldner, ‘Responsibility of  International Organizations: Introducing 
the ILC’s DARIO’, in A.  von Bogdandy and R.  Wolfrum (eds), Max Planck Yearbook of  United Nations 
Law (2012), vol. 16, at 281–328; Lozanorios, ‘Responsibility of  the United Nations for Wrongful Acts 
Occurred in the Framework of  Authorized Operations in Light of  the Draft Articles on the Responsibility 
of  International Organizations (dario)’, in Max Planck Yearbook of  United Nations Law (2014), vol. 18, 
at 109; Daugirdas, ‘Reputation and the Responsibility of  International Organizations’, 25(4) European 
Journal of  International Law (EJIL) (2015) 991. On shared responsibility, where international responsibil-
ity is attributed among actors, see the work and publications stemming from A. Nollkaemper, ‘SHARES 
Project’, available at www.sharesproject.nl/.
2 A recent and high-profile example of  this issue is the Haiti cholera claims. See Freedman and Lemay-
Hebert, ‘“Jistis ak reparasyon pou tout viktim kolera MINUSTAH”: The United Nations and the Right 
to Health in Haiti’, 28(3) Leiden Journal of  International Law (2015) 507; Freedman, ‘UN Immunity or 
Impunity?: A Human Rights Based Challenge’, 25(1) EJIL (2014) 239.
3 In response to the Rwanda report, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi  Annan, publicly stated that 
‘on behalf  of  the United Nations, I  acknowledge this failure and express my deep remorse’. He added 
that ‘both reports – my own on Srebrenica, and that of  the independent inquiry on Rwanda – reflect a 
profound determination to present the truth about these calamities’. United Nations (UN), Kofi  Annan 
Emphasizes Commitment to Enabling UN Never Again to Fail in Protecting Civilian Population From 
Genocide or Mass Slaughter, UN Doc. SG/SM/7263/AFR/196, 15 December 1999; see also UN, Report 
of  the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of  the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 
UN Doc. S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999; UN, Report on the Fall of  Srebrenica, UN Doc. A54/549, 15 
November 1999. That being said, no blame was attributed to any one particular individual or group of  
individuals, and accountability came only in the form of  expressions of  regret and changes to policies and 
practice (for example, through the creation of  the UN Human Rights Up Front Action Plan, available at 
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/detailed_hruf_plan_of_action.pdf.
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this is the Rwandan genocide, where no one was held responsible for the failures to pre-
vent the atrocities – from officials on the ground to the United Nations (UN) Secretary-
General. One scholar, B.S. Chimni, accordingly concluded: ‘[T]he UN represents, in 
the telling phrase of  Bauman, “the rule of  nobody”.’4 In order for accountability to be 
forthcoming, Chimni stresses that most work is needed in relation to individual respon-
sibility for action or inaction (acts of  commission and omission). Perhaps the most per-
nicious action or inaction, in relation to gravity and scale, is that which leads to a lack 
of  accountability for harms caused by peacekeepers, and nowhere is that problem more 
pressing than in relation to crimes of  sexual abuse.
Of  course, this is not a new problem. Throughout the history of  UN peacekeeping, 
sexual abuse has been perpetrated by the very people sent to restore or keep the peace. 
As peacekeeping operations have evolved both in terms of  size and complexity of  
mandates, there have been greater numbers of  victims of  such harms. And it is both 
the frequency with which they are committed and the gravity of  those crimes that 
demonstrate systemic weaknesses in laws, frameworks and practices of  peacekeeping. 
After all, we look to those peacekeepers to enter armed conflicts or fragile states with 
the mandate to protect locals, and, at the very least, we should expect them to ‘do no 
harm’.5
With the appointment of  a new UN Secretary-General comes the opportunity to pri-
oritize this issue that has been a stain on the UN’s reputation and has caused serious 
harms in some of  the world’s most fragile regions. The problem that must be addressed 
is complex in terms of  its historical and legal bases, which has resulted in difficulties in 
finding a workable solution. The laws and frameworks differ for civilian and military 
peacekeepers, but within both categories there are weaknesses that result in very few 
prosecutions of  those who perpetrate sexual abuse. As will be set out in detail, civil-
ian staff  are immune from the jurisdiction of  courts for any acts that fall under their 
official functions, and soldiers remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of  their home 
states for any acts they commit while deployed on peacekeeping missions. Police some-
times are deployed as civilian peacekeepers, troops or experts on mission – the latter 
category being inviolable and, therefore, immune from jurisdiction of  the host state. 
In theory, then, civilians accused of  sexual abuse ought to be handed over to local 
authorities because such crimes can never form part of  their official functions, and 
soldiers ought to be prosecuted by their home countries for crimes of  sexual abuse. 
However, as will be explored, there has been a near failure to implement those laws. 
The result is a near-total lack of  accountability, which has led to a culture of  impunity 
in which bystanders from within and outside the UN believe that reporting is futile, in 
which victims’ rights are violated a second time by a lack of  access to justice and in 
which would-be or opportunist perpetrators are emboldened in knowing that it is easy 
to ‘get away’ with such crimes.
4 Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’, 15(1) EJIL (2004) 1, 
at 22.
5 United Nations Department of  Peacekeeping Operations and Department of  Field Support, Civil Affairs 
Handbook (2012), at 70–71.
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Of  the many reasons why the current laws are not being implemented in relation 
to civilian staff, perhaps the most crucial is that in many peacekeeping contexts there 
are no local authorities, or, at least, not ones that are able or willing to uphold inter-
nationally accepted standards, to whom allegations may be referred. While the UN 
therefore does not have the power to investigate such allegations of  criminal activity,6 
there needs to be a functioning mechanism that upholds international standards on 
investigations, rule of  law, sentencing and punishment and other factors, to which 
alleged perpetrators may be sent. In relation to soldiers, there are again many factors 
that must be understood in relation to the failure to hold accountable perpetrators of  
sexual violence. These range from some countries having inadequate national laws on 
sexual abuse, to cultural and political resistance, and to failures by the UN to monitor 
and follow up on the implementation of  the legal obligations of  troop-contributing 
countries (TCCs). Such issues could be addressed through UN policies and political 
pressures (although such steps frequently do not go far enough to achieve those aims), 
but might better benefit from accountability mechanisms that function in the same 
way for civilians as for soldiers.
There are many factors involved in creating the culture of  impunity within which 
peacekeepers commit sexual abuse. These factors must be identified and addressed in 
order for meaningful and lasting change to occur. The UN focuses on three broad cate-
gories when seeking to address sexual abuse by peacekeepers: prevention, enforcement 
and remedial action, all of  which centre on the perpetrators. Within these categories, 
however, there are many aspects identified by scholars, practitioners and experts, 
ranging from pre-deployment training, to raising awareness about gender and cul-
tures, to the empowerment of  local populations, to foregrounding human rights and, 
crucially, to accountability laws and mechanisms alongside justice and support for 
victims. Indeed, there have been many attempts since 1996 to investigate, understand 
and address many of  these issues through internal and independent reviews of  the 
UN, reports, recommendations and proposed and enacted solutions. There have been 
very few changes made to implement robust methods for legal accountability that 
will serve as a deterrent, a punishment and a method for upholding victims’ rights. 
While it is important to address prevention and protection, doing so alone and with-
out looking at reforms for accountability is inadequate to address the scale and under-
lying causes of  the problem. What has become clear over the past two decades is that 
this problem cannot be addressed without a new victim-centred approach that goes 
beyond looking at ad hoc reforms7 and, instead, focuses on holistic policies, laws and 
frameworks.
6 Even though the UN does have the power to undertake investigations into misconduct that may be in 
breach of  an individual’s employment contract with the UN.
7 On ad hoc reform attempts within the UN, see G. Machel, Impact of  Armed Conflict on Children (1996); 
UN Secretary-General, Bulletin on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse, Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 (2003); S. Mendelson, Barracks and Brothels: Peacekeeping and 
Human Trafficking in the Balkans, February 2005; GA Res. A/59/710, 24 March 2005 (Zeid report); 
GA Res. 59/300, 22 June 2005; N.  Dahrendorf, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Lessons Learned 
Study, Addressing Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in MONUC, March 2006; C. Ferstman, Criminalizing 
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In this article, we set out how and why a new holistic approach is needed and stress 
that it ought to be centred on victims and human rights rather than on perpetrators 
and sovereignty. To do so, we start with an explanation of  the problems with existing 
laws and frameworks in the second section and with investigations and prosecutions 
in the third section. In the fourth section, we explore the need to implement human 
rights alongside criminal law and political processes in order to achieve justice and 
accountability, before concluding in the fifth section.
2 The Problem: Laws and Frameworks
The ad hoc evolution of  peacekeeping operations, combined with the ad hoc nature 
of  laws and policies governing such activities and personnel, has contributed to a cri-
sis of  accountability for harms caused by peacekeepers. Weak laws, combined with 
international organizations assuming the functions of  states while navigating who is 
in command and control, have resulted in the current state of  crisis. Since the UN’s 
founders did not conceive of  peacekeeping, no one specific legal framework was cre-
ated to cover peacekeeping personnel. Instead, what has occurred is the use of  more 
general frameworks for some personnel and the development of  bilateral and multi-
lateral agreements for others. As indicated above, there are two main categories of  
peacekeeping personnel: civilian and military.8 Different laws apply to each category, 
leading to a complex system that contains a myriad of  problems and weaknesses in 
terms of  the laws and their implementation and responsibility for ensuring that obli-
gations are upheld. However, it is not just the laws that are the problem but also the 
practices in relation to how those laws operate and are implemented on the ground. 
This section sets out the laws and frameworks governing UN peacekeepers, while sec-
tion 3 considers the practices that occur after an allegation is brought to the relevant 
authorities.
A Immunities and Jurisdictional Bars
The immunities and jurisdictional bars afforded to peacekeeping personnel seek to 
protect them from frivolous or pernicious interference by the host state, thus enabling 
personnel to undertake their functions and duties while on missions. The basic prem-
ise is sound and has its roots in diplomatic immunities.9 In order for nationals of  one 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers, United States Institute of  Peace Special Report 335, 
September 2013, available at www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR335-Criminalizing%20Sexual%20
Exploitation%20and%20Abuse%20by%20Peacekeepers.pdf; J. Stern, Reducing Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse in UN Peacekeeping: Ten Years after the Zeid Report, Stimson Centre, February 2015; Report of  
the Secretary-General on Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, 
Doc. A/70/72, 9 February 2016; UN, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse: Report of  the Secretary-General, Doc. A/70/729, 16 February 2016.
8 Police deployed on peacekeeping operations may fall under the category of  troops, civilians or experts on 
mission; therefore, this article does not deal with police as a separate category of  peacekeepers.
9 For a detailed discussion of  the law on diplomatic immunity, see E.  Denza, Commentary on the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (2016).
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country to operate in other states, frequently where such operations might be viewed 
with hostility, those personnel require protection from local interference. The coun-
terbalance for these protective laws in relation to diplomats and states is that there is 
a series of  bilateral relations and agreements between those countries that have diplo-
matic relations with one another. Therefore, if  one country refuses to waive immunity 
or to prosecute its national personnel who commit crimes when abroad, then there are 
two options open to the other country: first, to declare the individual persona non grata, 
revoke his/her diplomatic credentials and force the diplomat to leave the country or, 
second, to break diplomatic ties and relations with that state altogether. This counter-
balance has been used effectively to leverage compliance with national criminal laws, 
and there have been some very public examples of  states severing diplomatic relations 
for these very reasons.10 Where it comes to the UN, however, such a counterbalance 
does not exist. Host countries do not have the ability to exert such leverage against the 
UN; thus, a system results where the UN holds all of  the power despite its personnel 
operating on the sovereign territory of  the host state.
This power imbalance is key to understanding why peacekeeping personnel are able 
to ‘get away’ with crimes with such alarming frequency. As we shall see, in theory, the 
immunities or jurisdictional bars will not protect UN personnel who commit crimes 
from being brought to justice. The system is designed in such a way that only frivo-
lous or pernicious interference is blocked by the multilateral or bilateral agreements. 
Crucially, however, in practice, the current legal frameworks have created a culture 
of  impunity owing to the difficulties or unwillingness to prosecute personnel who do 
commit crimes during peacekeeping operations. In order to understand the problem, 
it is important first to understand the separate regimes governing different types of  
personnel before then turning to what happens in practice and the impact on justice 
and accountability.
B Civilian Staff
Civilian peacekeeping personnel are international civil servants with immunity from 
the jurisdiction of  any national court. UN officials are granted immunities under 
provisions in Article V of  the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of  the United 
Nations (CPIUN).11 Immunity provides an individual with protection from all aspects 
of  legal processes, and there are two types of  immunity in relation to UN civilian staff: 
personal or functional. Personal immunity protects an individual from all legal pro-
cesses at any time and is given to the highest level of  UN staff, such as the Secretary-
General, heads of  offices and agencies and the heads of  peacekeeping operations, 
among others. All other civilian staff  are given functional immunity, which protects 
them from legal processes in relation to any act that falls within their official functions.
10 See, e.g., Higgins ‘The Abuse of  Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Recent United Kingdom 
Experience’, 79(3) American Journal of  International Law (AJIL) (1985) 641.
11 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of  the United Nations (CPIUN) 1946, 1 UNTS 15.
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Officially, the UN agrees with the idea that immunity of  most civilian personnel is 
functional as opposed to absolute; thus, that no immunity will operate with respect to 
actions that are not part of  a person’s official functions. Whether the crime commit-
ted was part of  his or her official functions is not about whether the person was ‘on 
duty’ at that time but, rather, whether the act being carried out that led to a crime 
was part of  that person conducting his or her job. It is clear then that some crimes 
such as driving while drunk or unlawful killing may in some contexts be covered by 
functional immunity, whereas other crimes such as rape will never fall within that 
sphere.12 Where there is a question as to whether functional immunity applies, the UN 
must make such a determination based on internal investigations not into whether 
the crime was committed but, rather, into the context within which it occurred. No 
such determination needs to be made in relation to those crimes or contexts that do 
not fall within an individual’s official functions.
The theory, then, is sound, but the problems exist in relation to how they are imple-
mented in practice. There are two problematic areas in this respect: first, the UN 
investigations into whether functional immunity applies and, second, the host states’ 
lack of  counterbalance to the UN’s power in this regard. In relation to investigations, 
despite the clear lack of  a mandate to do so, the UN conducts its own internal inves-
tigations into all allegations of  crimes irrespective of  whether the crime committed is 
able to form part of  an individual’s official functions and whether the context in which 
the crime was committed was part of  a person’s official duties. Moreover, these inves-
tigations typically go beyond whether functional immunity applies and, instead, focus 
on whether there is sufficient evidence to cooperate with local authorities.13 Clearly, 
this is deeply problematic and undermines the very foundations of  functional immu-
nity, providing a cloak for perpetrators rather than a shield against pernicious allega-
tions. The result is that the current system of  immunities operates as absolute despite 
clearly being intended to be functional.
In relation to the host states’ lack of  counterbalance, there is the related problem 
that after conducting such investigations the UN then must provide an explicit or tacit 
waiver of  immunity.14 The waiver must be explicit where the crime has formed part of  
official functions, but there is a tacit waiver in other circumstances given that the UN 
has taken upon itself  the ability to determine whether functional immunity applies 
despite it being an objective rather than a subjective test. As already noted, where a 
diplomat commits a crime that does fall within official functions and is covered by 
functional immunity, and the sending state fails to waive that immunity, the host state 
has two options to counterbalance that decision. However, there is no clause allow-
ing host states to declare UN staff  persona non grata, thus meaning that there is no 
12 See, e.g., Miller, ‘Legal Aspects of  Stopping Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peacekeeping Operations’, 
39 Cornell International Law Journal (2006) 71, at 92.
13 This has been exposed most recently in terms of  UN investigations into allegations against personnel in 
Haiti and Central African Republic, as evidenced in UN Office of  Internal Oversight Services reports (e.g., 
in 2015).
14 CPIUN, supra note 11, Art. 5, s. 20; Art. VI, s. 23.
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recourse for the host state if  a crime is committed and the UN fails to waive immunity 
or to comply with the local investigative authorities.
C Experts on Mission
Similar provisions (Article VI of  the CPIUN) and practices govern UN experts on mis-
sions as occur in relation to civilian staff.15 Those experts on mission have functional 
immunity in relation to acts committed while on mission. However, in addition, those 
individuals are deemed to be inviolable while on mission. Inviolability goes beyond 
immunity from legal processes in relation to an act and provides a protection of  the 
person from any interference with their integrity while on mission. Inviolability 
attaches directly to the person and prevents an individual from being arrested or 
detained until after their mission finishes. Therefore, even if  an act falls outside of  their 
official functions, nothing can be done while the expert remains on mission. This is an 
important additional aspect to understand given that many police deployed on peace-
keeping missions are experts on mission and, therefore, hold both functional immu-
nity and are considered inviolable.
D Military Personnel
Military personnel are not afforded the same immunities as their civilian counter-
parts.16 Soldiers are not directly employed by the UN; they remain under the control of  
their home country, which in turn has a contract with the UN. Those individuals are 
covered by bilateral agreements between their sending state (the TCC) and the UN,17 
and it is that document that sets out jurisdiction over such personnel if  they commit 
crimes while on peacekeeping operations.18 Military personnel operate under a system 
where the host state is barred from exercising jurisdiction in relation to crimes com-
mitted by those individuals. That is not an immunity per se as the TCC retains exclusive 
jurisdiction over its own soldiers and commits to exercise that jurisdiction to prosecute 
troops who commit criminal offences while on missions.19 However, it does operate 
15 Miller, ‘United Nations Experts on Mission and their Privileges and Immunities’, 4 International 
Organizations Law Review (2007) 11.
16 For an in-depth discussion, see Deen-Racsmány, ‘Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction over UN Peacekeepers 
and the UN Project(s) on Criminal Accountability: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy’, 53 Military Law and Law of  
War Review (2013) 247.
17 These are based on the Model Memorandum of  Understanding between the United Nations and [par-
ticipating state] Contributing Resources to [the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation] in Manual on 
Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of  Contingent-Owned Equipment 
of  Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions, UN Doc. A/C.5/66/8, 27 October 
2011.
18 The bilateral agreements between the UN and the host states (Report of  the Secretary-General on Model 
Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations, UN Doc. A/45/594, 9 October 1990), fur-
ther underscore that jurisdiction over military personnel belongs exclusively to the troop-contributing 
countries.
19 UN General Assembly (UNGA), Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peacekeeping Operations, Doc. 
A/45/594, 9 October 1990.
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as an absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of  the host state. The jurisdictional 
bars prevent host countries from investigating or prosecuting any crimes, regardless 
of  whether they were committed as part of  official functions. The TCC is obligated to 
investigate and prosecute such crimes, with the UN being limited to administrative 
investigations and, even then, only if  the TCC fails to undertake its own investigations 
within 10 days of  an allegation being handed over to its authorities. Prosecutions may 
occur by the host state if  a soldier is court-martialled in situ and handed over to local 
authorities or if  that soldier is taken to military courts or national courts in their home 
state. The decision as to how to proceed, therefore, belongs exclusively to the TCC.20
There are two main problems with this system. First, troops frequently are not held 
accountable by their own countries for legal and political reasons. As will be explored 
below, not all TCCs are able to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over acts commit-
ted by their soldiers while on peacekeeping operations. Even where they are able to 
do so, the reality is that such states rarely, if  ever, prosecute their soldiers. Often, that 
is because there is insufficient evidence gathered to do so – a problem attributable to 
investigating crimes committed abroad and in fragile states or conflict zones. Or it may 
be because of  the national political implications of  doing so and the likelihood that 
such prosecutions would undermine national support for contributing troops to UN 
peacekeeping operations. Second, the removal of  host state jurisdiction results in a 
lack of  access to justice for victims, something that highlights the problem with the 
legal frameworks centring on perpetrators and state sovereignty rather than on vic-
tims and human rights.
What becomes clear from these laws is that the system has been designed in such 
a way that peacekeepers are able and ought to be prosecuted for serious crimes while 
being protected from unwarranted interference. In practice, however, the record of  
immunities and jurisdictional bars has been deeply problematic. Currently, civilian 
personnel frequently operate with impunity owing to the UN failing to ensure that 
immunity is waived where crimes have been committed, and soldiers almost always 
are returned to their country and the matter is quietly dropped.21 Ultimately, then, the 
country where the crime or abuses occurred is prevented from holding the perpetra-
tors accountable because of  the jurisdictional bars and immunities, and, in relation 
to soldiers at least, the country that does have jurisdiction (and potentially custody) is 
the one that will not exercise its jurisdiction.
3 The Problem: Investigations and Prosecutions
The problem of  sexual abuse by, and lack of  accountability of, peacekeepers has its 
roots not only in flawed laws and frameworks governing immunities and jurisdic-
tional bars but also in the practices that occur once an allegation is made. The most 
20 On these matters, see R. Burke, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN Military Contingents: Moving beyond 
the Current Status Quo and Responsibility under International Law (2014).
21 See, e.g., Grady, ‘Sex, Statistics, Peacekeepers and Power’, 79(6) Modern Law Review (2016) 931.
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problematic issue in relation to such practices is that the institutions employing those 
peacekeepers are tasked with, or assume responsibility for, investigating allegations. 
As with the laws themselves, different regimes cover civilian and military peacekeep-
ers, with deep flaws throughout the rules and practices of  those investigatory regimes. 
It is important to understand the problems with both regimes because this is an issue 
that cuts across all categories of  peacekeeping personnel.22
A UN Internal Investigations
In theory, under the laws governing functional immunity when an allegation is made 
against a UN civilian staff  member, the UN’s sole investigatory role is to determine 
whether functional immunity applies. Such a determination would require a two-part 
test: objectively, is the act one that may form part of  official functions and, if  so, subjec-
tively, did that individual commit the act as part of  his or her official functions? Of  course, 
in many circumstances, the UN must conduct some form of  administrative investigation 
into its personnel to determine whether functional immunity applies. Those powers are 
intended only to enable the UN to determine whether its personnel holds immunity in 
relation to the allegation and, if  so, to make a decision as to whether to waive that immu-
nity. In practice, however, the UN uses those investigatory powers to examine evidence 
of  an allegation and, by doing so, the organization acts ultra vires. This is a fundamental 
issue that frequently is overlooked in scholarship and in practitioner reports.
There are two points to note here. First, the UN holds the same powers as all employ-
ers to conduct internal investigations regarding its personnel in relation to whether an 
act committed is in violation of  contractual obligations. Second, some peacekeeping 
operations take place where there are no functioning rule-of-law institutions that are 
able to conduct investigations or prosecutions. While these factors must be borne in 
mind, they are ones that ought to be addressed after establishing the frameworks gov-
erning UN investigations rather than being used as a carte blanche method for the UN 
overreaching its investigatory powers when an allegation is received. As it stands, UN 
investigations into serious misconduct could be carried out by at least four different 
bodies. While there are links between the work carried out by those bodies, they serve 
very different functions and are governed by different rules. Their overlap can, and 
frequently does, lead to situations where no particular body takes responsibility for an 
investigation, which in turn results in allegations being mishandled at best.23
22 Indeed, a detailed breakdown of  the UN’s figures show that, contrary to commonly held perceptions, 
around half  of  the total number of  complaints of  sexual abuse over the last decade have been made 
against police and civilian UN staff, rather than its peacekeeping soldiers, despite soldiers vastly outnum-
bering police and civilians in most peacekeeping missions. See the UN’s sexual exploitation and abuse 
(SEA) database at http://cdu.unlb.org/.
23 The problems with overlap and duplication can be seen in relation to how allegations were handled 
in relation to the Central African Republic in 2015, where Anders Kompass blew the whistle on the 
UN’s failure to hand over allegations of  abuse by French peacekeepers during a France-run peacekeep-
ing operation. R. Freedman, ‘French Peacekeeper Abuse Scandal Fits an Old Pattern of  Impunity’, The 
Conversation (29 April 2015), available at https://theconversation.com/french-peacekeeper-abuse-scan-
dal-fits-an-old-pattern-of-impunity-40991. For further discussion on the broader issues, see Grady, supra 
note 21.
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The Conduct and Discipline Unit (CDU) was originally created at UN headquarters 
in 2005 following recommendations by the Zeid report.24 It is one of  the few recom-
mendations that was enacted almost immediately after the report was published25 and 
was fully operational by April 2006.26 Its two main functions are: ‘to advise personnel 
and mission leadership alike on all matters of  conduct and discipline; [and to] ensure 
the coherence of  administrative and disciplinary procedures.’27 Alongside the main 
CDU at headquarters, conduct and discipline units also form part of  all peacekeeping 
missions. Those in-country units have specific functions including receiving all allega-
tions of  misconduct, making recommendations on investigations including forward-
ing them to the Office of  Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)28 and reporting all serious 
misconduct to mission heads.29 They also report allegations to relevant investigative 
bodies and report back to victims and local populations about investigation results as 
well as liaise with UN gender and children teams.30
All allegations of  sexual abuse received by the CDU must be reported to the OIOS, 
which contrasts with all other allegations of  serious misconduct and reflects the per-
nicious and widespread incidents of  sexual abuse perpetrated by peacekeepers. The 
OIOS then records and evaluates all allegations before prioritizing those to be investi-
gated and about which it will conduct preliminary investigations31 or dismissing those 
it deems to have insufficient evidence for investigation. The OIOS was established in 
1994 to carry out audit, investigation, inspection and evaluation services, includ-
ing establishing ‘facts related to reports of  possible misconduct to guide the Secretary 
General on jurisdictional or disciplinary action to be taken’. It also partly replicates the 
work of  the UN Ethics Office, which was established in 2006 after the World Summit 
conference of  the previous year to ensure ‘that all staff  members perform their func-
tions consistent with the highest standards of  integrity as required by the Charter of  
the United Nations’.
There are other mechanisms involved with allegations against civilian staff. 
In 2009, a UN Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) was established as a civil tribunal to hear 
and decide cases filed by, or on behalf  of, current and former staff  members. Many 
24 UNGA, Comprehensive Review of  the Whole Question of  Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects, 
UN Doc. A/59/710, 24 March 2005, para. 42.
25 It was enacted in November 2005.
26 UNGA, Report of  the Office of  Internal Oversight Services on Its Investigation into Allegations of  Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in the Ituri Region (Bunia) in the United Nations Organization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of  the Congo, UN Doc. A/61/841, 5 April 2007, para. 32.
27 W. Durch, K.  Andres and M.  England, Improving Criminal Accountability in United Nations Peace 
Operations, Stimson Center Report no. 65, June 2009, at 12.
28 UN, Comprehensive Report of  Conduct and Discipline Including Full Justification of  All Posts, UN Doc. 
A/62/758, 20 March 2008, paras 23–28.
29 UNGA, Comprehensive Report Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 59/296 on Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, including Policy Development, Implementation and Full Justification of  
Proposed Capacity on Personnel Conduct Issues, UN Doc. A/60/862, 24 May 2006, paras 38–53.
30 Durch, Andres and England, supra note 27, at 13.
31 UNGA, supra note 26, para. 7; UNGA, Implementation of  the Recommendations of  the Special Committee 
on Peacekeeping Operations, Addendum, UN Doc. A/61/668/Add.1, 22 December 2006, para. 8.
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peacekeeping missions also have police components, which may be tasked with car-
rying out internal investigations into alleged criminal wrongdoing by the UN peace-
keeping personnel. In addition, there is a Digital Forensics Unit for forensic recovery 
and analysis of  digital information32 as well as integrated teams in some countries.33 
The overlap among these various investigatory and adjudicative bodies, however, can 
hinder effective investigations and make it difficult for victims of  sexual exploitation 
and abuse to know how to lodge and track complaints. Crucially, none of  those bodies 
has the power to undertake criminal investigations into acts that fall outside of  official 
functions.
It is important to note that the UN will not hand over a civilian staff  member to local 
authorities in situations where there are issues with the rule of  law, human rights or 
institutions within the host state (and, in the case of  fair trial or other fundamental 
human rights, the UN cannot hand over a civilian staff  member). This is an exception 
to the rule on how the UN ought to deal with crimes that do not fall within official 
functions. In those cases, however, civilians could be prosecuted by their home states, 
but it would only occur if  their home country has legislation that asserts extraterri-
torial criminal jurisdiction for these particular actions and sufficient evidence for a 
successful prosecution can be gathered, which is not always the case.
B Investigations in Troop-Contributing Countries
The UN creates bilateral status-of-forces agreements with host countries. These agree-
ments contain the jurisdictional bars that preclude the host state from using legal 
processes in relation to soldiers who commit crimes while on mission. Of  course, this 
absolute immunity can be waived by the TCC, although that rarely happens. Instead, 
TCCs prefer – in word, at least, if  not in deed – to investigate and prosecute their troops 
if  they commit crimes. TCCs are bound by legal obligations to investigate and, where 
appropriate, punish soldiers who commit sexual abuse while operating under the UN 
umbrella. The bilateral agreements that those countries make with the UN – memo-
randa of  understanding34 – set out that TCCs have 10 days to start an investigation 
from the time they receive information from the UN regarding allegations of  miscon-
duct by its troops. If  a TCC fails to do so, the UN may initiate its own administrative 
investigation. In practice, however, these obligations frequently have been ignored 
both by states and by the UN.35 Many TCCs do not send national investigating officers 
32 Activities of  the Office of  Internal Oversight Services on Peacekeeping Operations for the Period 1 January 
to 31 December 2012, UN Doc. A/67/297 (Part II), 13 March 2012, para. 7.
33 E.g., Central African Republic.
34 Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and Its Working Group, Draft Model Memorandum of  
Understanding, Doc. A/61/19 (Part III), 12 June 2007, Annex.
35 Deen-Racsmány, ‘The Amended UN Model Memorandum of  Understanding: A New Incentive for States 
to Discipline and Prosecute Military Members of  National Peacekeeping Contingents?’, 16(2) Journal 
of  Conflict and Security Law (2011) 342, at 348, citing statistics from 2005 to 2011. Department of  
Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Monthly Summary of  Military and Police Contribution to United Nations 
Operations, available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/documents/Yearly06.
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with the troops that are deployed, which undermines their ability to conduct prompt 
investigations into allegations. And even where such investigations do occur, the UN 
has little power – and, seemingly, little desire – to compel the countries to report on 
the findings.
A key problem with accountability of  troops goes beyond investigations and revolves 
around TCCs frequently being unwilling or even unable to prosecute crimes commit-
ted by troops when operating abroad.36 First, and as mentioned, many countries do 
not have the legal authority to prosecute domestic crimes extraterritorially.37 National 
laws frequently only cover crimes committed on national territory, and while some 
militaries do have extraterritorial reach in terms of  laws governing soldiers, this is 
not always the case. Other countries only have such extraterritorial powers if  the acts 
are deemed criminal in both the country where they occurred and in the country of  
nationality of  the perpetrator,38 which is problematic when it comes to definitions of  
sexual abuse. Soldiers may be held accountable through their military justice systems, 
but, again, that is not the case for all TCCs. And even where such prosecutions are able 
to take place, TCCs have to balance domestic pressures not to prosecute troops with UN 
efforts to encourage them to do so.39
It is important to understand the economics and politics of  contributing troops to 
UN peacekeeping operations. Many of  the countries that contribute the most troops 
do so for the status and power that it gives them within the UN and because the finan-
cial rewards of  doing so can be significant. The UN gives countries a standard fee for 
troops, which in some states far exceeds the salaries that those troops are paid. Those 
countries, then, have significant interests in remaining contributors to UN peacekeep-
ing operations and are reluctant to invoke any domestic pressures to reduce those 
contributions.
As a result of  TCCs taking little action in relation to allegations of  sexual abuse per-
petrated by their soldiers, a range of  political measures have been recommended or 
implemented over recent years. In March 2016, the UN Security Council voted to give 
the Secretary-General the right to repatriate entire units if  the TCC fails to prosecute 
alleged perpetrators of  sexual misconduct within six months.40 The Security Council 
requested that the Secretary-General ensure that the replacement of  personnel from 
troop- or police-contributing countries be a process that upholds standards of  conduct 
36 See, generally, Wills ‘Continuing Impunity of  Peacekeepers: The Need for a Convention’, 4(1) Journal of  
International Humanitarian Legal Studies (2013) 47.
37 UNGA, Report of  the Secretary-General, Criminal accountability of  United Nations officials and experts 
on mission, UN Doc. A/63/260, 11 August 2008.
38 UNGA, Ensuring the Accountability of  United Nations Staff  and Experts on Mission with Respect to 
Criminal Acts Committed in Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/60/980, 16 August 2006.
39 See, e.g., UNGA, Investigation by the Office of  Internal Oversight Services into Allegations of  Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of  the 
Congo, UN Doc. A/59/66, 5 January 2005, especially paras 46, 38. See also the comments on this topic 
by the Congolese delegates to the Sixth Committee in 2009 and 2011. UN Summary Records of  the Sixth 
Committee, UN Doc. A/C.6/64/SR.7, 10 November 2009; UN Doc. A/C.6/66/SR.9, 7 October 2011.
40 SC Res. 2272, 11 March 2016.
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and discipline and appropriately addresses allegations or confirmed acts of  sexual 
exploitation and abuse by their personnel. This was heralded by the US ambassador 
to the UN, Samantha Power, as the UN ‘finally doing something about the cancer in 
the United Nations system’, despite it being a discretionary and political tool.41 A simi-
lar method for dealing with this issue is ‘naming and shaming’ countries that do not 
investigate, prosecute and report allegations of  sexual abuse. It will take some time to 
know whether such measures are effective, particularly in relation to the larger and 
more powerful TCCs.
C Barriers to Accountability
What becomes clear when exploring these laws and practices is that there are three 
main issues that must be addressed: gaps in the substantive law; the need for greater 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and the implementation of  existing legal obligations. First, 
there currently exists a fundamental substantive law problem in relation to the lack 
of  internationally agreed definitions of  sexual abuse. This problem is exacerbated by 
failures at some national levels to have laws that comply with international standards 
on sexual crimes. In order to address these issues, there needs to be agreement within 
the international arena as to what constitutes sexual abuse, followed by discussions as 
to how those definitions might be upheld within military or domestic laws of  countries 
that contribute personnel to peacekeeping operations. Second, there is a global situ-
ation whereby many countries lack universal or extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
for sexual crimes. The scope and quantity of  the lacunae is significant among TCCs, 
and the need for extraterritorial jurisdiction is as important for civilian peacekeep-
ers as it is for troops. Third, the failures of  the UN and TCCs to uphold their existing 
obligations is a significant barrier to accountability, and methods for addressing this 
problem are explored in later in this article. These fundamental issues must be over-
come to ensure that existing laws and policies can be upheld, although, as will be 
demonstrated, there also needs to be a more holistic approach to accountability that 
goes beyond the focus on criminal law.
4 A New Victim-Centred Approach
To date, the UN approach to accountability has constantly placed perpetrators and 
state sovereignty at the heart of  all laws and frameworks. In order to adopt a more 
holistic and appropriate approach to accountability for UN peacekeepers, though, 
there needs to be a shift away from this. Moreover, there needs to be a recognition that 
the same human rights obligations that bind states – and which have increasingly 
developed since the UN was established – bind the UN when it acts as an external actor.
41 ‘Security Council Asks Secretary-General to Replace Contingents from Countries Failing to Hold Sexual 
Predators Accountable’, UN News Centre (11 March 2016).
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The UN itself  has long accepted that the ‘international responsibility of  the United 
Nations for the activities of  United Nations forces is an attribute of  its international 
legal personality and its capacity to bear international rights and obligations’.42 In 
2004, the UN’s legal counsel noted that ‘[a]s a subsidiary organ of  the United Nations, 
an act of  a peacekeeping force is, in principle, imputable to the Organization, and if  
committed in violation of  an international obligation entails the international respon-
sibility of  the Organization and its liability in compensation’.43 This acceptance of  
responsibility, however, is based on compensation for harms caused rather than a 
wider acceptance of  responsibility for upholding and implementing human rights. It 
is widely accepted that the UN is subject to norms of  jus cogens and by at least some 
parts of  general international law.44 It is also widely accepted that customary inter-
national law and the general principles of  responsibility can apply to international 
organizations,45 but whether and to what extent the UN is bound by international 
human rights law (IHRL) and, if  so by which obligations, remains a contested topic.
A straightforward reading of  the Charter of  the United Nations is that the UN must 
promote human rights (Articles 1(3), 55 and 56), but those provisions direct an 
organization that was intended to be a forum within which member states agree upon 
actions that must be taken. As the UN has developed, it is clear that the organization 
serves different purposes at different times. As such, there is significant scope for argu-
ing that the Charter provisions indicate that the UN must also promote human rights 
when acting externally rather than as a forum. Any actions that violate human rights 
would therefore contradict the UN’s purposes and certainly would not be ‘necessary’ 
for their achievement. It appears contradictory, at best, that the UN would hold immu-
nity with regard to such acts. However, that in itself  does not demonstrate that the UN 
is bound by IHRL.
A number of  scholars in recent years have examined the extent to which the UN 
is bound by IHRL. Frédéric Mégret and Florian Hoffmann set out three conceptions 
for how the UN may be bound by human rights obligations: the internal conception, 
the external conception and the hybrid conception.46 Noelle Quenivet focuses on 
42 UN Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of  the Financing of  the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, Doc. A/51/389 (1996), para. 6.
43 Unpublished letter from the United Nations Legal Counsel to the Director of  the Codification Division, 3 
February 2004, quoted in Report of  the International Law Commission, UNGA Official Records, 56th 
Session, Supplement no. 10, Doc. A/59/10 (2004), at 111.
44 For further discussion, see R. Higgins, Problems and Processes: International Law and How We Use It (1994), 
at 181; F.  Morgenstern, Legal Problems of  International Organizations (1986), at 32; A.  Orakhelashvili, 
Collective Security (2011), at 56; Orakhelashvili, ‘The Acts of  the Security Council: Meaning and 
Standards of  Review’, in Max Planck Yearbook of  United Nations Law (2007), vol. 11, at 143–195; Maus, 
‘Human Rights in Peacekeeping Missions’, in H.-J. Heintz and A.  Zwitter (eds), International Law and 
Humanitarian Assistance (2011) 103.
45 Sheeran and Bevilaqua, ‘The UN Security Council and International Human Rights Obligations: Towards 
a New Theory of  Constraints and Derogations’, in S. Sheeran and N. Rodley (eds), Routledge Handbook of  
International Human Rights Law (2013) 371.
46 Mégret and Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Rights Violator? Some Reflections on the United Nations 
Changing Human Rights Responsibilities’, 25(2) Human Rights Quarterly (2003) 314.
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whether the UN may be bound by IHRL treaties;47 Tom Dannenbaum examines the 
UN’s legal personality and insists that it gives rise to human rights obligations that 
form part of  customary international law;48 and Olivier de Schutter proposes a ‘slid-
ing scales’ theory.49 Some scholars have fused discussions of  UN human rights obliga-
tions and immunity,50 and others argue that members have a positive duty to enforce 
the Charter’s human rights obligations ‘over and above any other international law 
granting immunity’,51 with Jordan Paust insisting that the proposition that the UN 
has immunity even where that would violate human rights is ‘counterintuitive’.52 
But those discussions largely remain at the theoretical level.53 More practical discus-
sions of  accountability for UN personnel in peacekeeping operations largely focuses 
on criminal offences and laws of  war, which are informative but do not address the 
human rights violations that occur when victims are denied access to a court and a 
remedy and to truth.54 There are limited reported cases, reflecting the difficulties in 
bringing the UN or its personnel before courts, and the jurisprudence that does exist 
from national and regional courts focuses either on broader issues of  immunity or on 
private law claims arising from criminal acts.55 As we shall see, the evolving line of  
case law discussing issues of  immunity and human rights, as well as the UN’s use of  
human rights mechanisms to address harms caused, provides a strong basis for adopt-
ing a human rights-based approach.
A A Victim-Centred Approach
Ensuring a holistic and victim-centred approach means placing relevant aspects of  
criminal justice, truth and reconciliation, human rights and political processes at the 
heart of  responses to allegations of  sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by peacekeep-
ers. This section explores these approaches, drawing upon theory and practices to 
understand how different aspects of  these models may be appropriate when designing 
a system to deal with UN peacekeeping personnel.
47 Quenivet, ‘Binding the United Nations to Human Rights Norms by Way of  the Laws of  Treaties’, 42 
George Washington International Law Review (2010) 587.
48 Dannenbaum, ‘Translating the Standard of  Effective Control into a System of  Effective Accountability’, 
51(1) Harvard International Law Journal (HILJ) (2010) 113.
49 De Schutter, ‘Human Rights and the Rise of  International Organisations: The Logic of  Sliding Scales in 
the Law International Responsabilité’, in J. Wouters et al. (eds), Accountability for Human Rights Violations 
by International Organisations (2011) 51.
50 Wouters and Schmitt, ‘Challenging Acts of  Other United Nations’ Organs, Subsidiary Organs and 
Officials’, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies Working Paper no. 49, April 2010.
51 Rios and Flaherty, ‘Legal Accountability of  International Organization: Challenges and Reforms’, 16 
International Law Students Association Journal of  International and Comparative Law (2010) 433.
52 Paust, ‘The UN Is Bound By Human Rights; Understanding the Full Reach of  Human Rights, Remedies, 
and Nonimmunity’, 51 HILJ (2010) 1.
53 Freedman, supra note 2, however, has taken these theoretical foundations and applied them in the prac-
tical context of  the UN’s operations. This work, in turn, takes those more developed foundations and 
applies them in the context of  individuals harmed by SEA.
54 For detailed discussion on human and accountability, see Freedman, supra note 2.
55 Conduct in UN Field Missions maintains a database of  SEA cases, available at http://cdu.unlb.org/.
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1 Criminal Justice
The use of  criminal justice to hold accountable actors in the international arena 
began with the Nuremberg trials following World War II.56 Those trials focused on 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, and they are the foundations of  
the modern system of  international criminal law (ICL). Yet it was not until the early 
1990s, in relation to the former Republic of  Yugoslavia and to Rwanda, that ICL was 
once again enforced through an international tribunal and, since that time, has been 
enforced again in relation to crises in Cambodia (1997), Sierra Leone (2002), Iraq 
(2003) and Lebanon (2009).57 These courts and tribunals were created alongside 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was established by the 1998 Rome 
Statute.58
Despite these mechanisms existing to tackle what are seen as the most pernicious 
harms at the international level – of  which SEA by peacekeepers is undoubtedly one 
– there are two main reasons why ICL mechanisms in isolation are inappropriate for 
holding accountable peacekeepers who commit serious crimes. First, those courts and 
tribunals focus on international crimes, which are not the same as ordinary crimes 
committed within the international arena.59 And, second, those mechanisms only 
prosecute those individuals most responsible for international crimes, which includes 
military and political leaders.60 In those scenarios, the perpetrators of  individual 
crimes if  brought to justice are done so by national courts rather than by these inter-
national mechanisms.
International crimes are those crimes committed as part of  a systemic pattern 
seeking to oppress, subjugate or destroy local populations. While those crimes may 
include murder, rape, looting, arson and many other criminal acts, the basis for ICL 
is the context within which those crimes are committed and the purpose for which 
those crimes are perpetrated. As such, where sexual violence is used to persecute or 
strike terror into a population, it may form the basis of  a war crime or crime against 
humanity or, where rape is used to prevent the future birth of  children accepted by 
a particular religion or ethnicity, then it may even form the basis for genocide, and 
it is that which distinguishes crimes of  sexual abuse from international crimes that 
have been perpetrated through acts of  sexual abuse.61 That distinction is crucial when 
thinking about accountability for peacekeepers who perpetrate sexual abuse because 
it then becomes clear why it is impossible to use the ICC or internationalized courts 
or tribunals to prosecute those peacekeepers. Although sexual abuse by peacekeepers 
is widespread, no evidence has been produced to demonstrate that those crimes are 
committed as part of  wider or systematic attempts to repress, subjugate or destroy 
56 P. Sands, From Nuremberg to the Hague: The Future of  International Criminal Justice (2003).
57 W.A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals (2006).
58 Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.
59 A. Cassesse, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones, The Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court (2002).
60 Ibid.
61 For a broad discussion on prosecuting rape as a war crime, see Goldstone, ‘Prosecuting Rape as a War 
Crime’, 34 Case Western Reserve Journal of  International Law (2002) 277.
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local populations,62 which means that even where those crimes are systemic they do 
not amount to international crimes.
Even though international courts and tribunals are not appropriate for prosecut-
ing peacekeepers who perpetrate crimes of  sexual abuse, there have been proposals 
for hybrid courts that could prosecute crimes committed within the international 
arena.63 Those proposals build upon the hybrid nature of  the mechanisms developed 
for Cambodia, Chad, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste. These 
mechanisms have hybridity not only in terms of  composition and applicable law but 
also in terms of  the types of  crimes they have been able to prosecute.64 The proposals 
for hybrid courts in Burundi, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of  Congo, 
Kenya, Liberia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan have all focused upon prosecuting 
hybrid, rather than international, crimes. And while none of  those mechanisms have 
yet to be implemented, the discussions around their form, nature and jurisdiction give 
a clear indication of  the validity and possibility of  setting up internationalized hybrid 
mechanisms that are able to prosecute criminal acts.
2 Truth and Reconciliation
During the lengthy period between the Nuremberg trials and the establishment of  the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, a differ-
ent form of  accountability mechanism was widely used across parts of  Latin America 
and later developed and used in many other parts of  the world. This mechanism is the 
truth commission,65 which is a key form of  transitional justice that focuses on restor-
ative, rather than retributive, models of  justice.66 Truth-seeking entities have been 
used in Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and parts of  Africa. While the 
design of  these mechanisms has varied, at their heart has been the right to truth and 
a victim-centred approach. The fundamental principles include truth, transparency, 
inclusivity and accountability in the forms of  apologies, reparations or other meth-
ods. While a truth-seeking entity is not sufficient on its own to address the problem of  
peacekeepers who commit sexual abuse, there are many aspects of  the methodology 
and approach of  these mechanisms that can and should be incorporated into the lens 
through which UN accountability laws are framed and implemented.
62 Despite attempts by some commentators to argue that the International Criminal Court is an appropri-
ate mechanism for these crimes. On SEA as an international crime, see O’Brien, ‘Sexual Exploitation and 
Beyond: Using the Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court to Prosecute UN Peacekeepers for 
Gender-Based Crimes’, 11(4) International Criminal Law Review (2011) 803.
63 See Dickinson, ‘The Promise of  Hybrid Courts’, 97 AJIL (2003) 295; P.  McAuliffe, ‘Hybrid Courts in 
Retrospect: Of  Lost Legacies and Modest Futures’, in W.A. Schabas et  al. (eds), The Ashgate Research 
Companion to International Criminal Law (2013) 453.
64 Scharf, ‘The Iraqi High Tribunal: A Viable Experiment in International Justice?’, 5 Journal of  International 
Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2007) 258; Sisson and Bassin, ‘Was the Dujalil Trial Fair?’, (2007) 5 JICJ 272.
65 Also known as truth and reconciliation commissions.
66 P. de Greiff, The Handbook of  Reparations (2008).
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The right to truth is enshrined within international instruments67 and has been 
focused upon by the UN Human Rights Council,68 the Office of  the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights,69 treaty bodies70 and special procedures.71 At the regional level, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of  
Human Rights have been central in developing jurisprudence on the right to truth. 
This commission has emphasized the right of  societies, as well as of  individuals, to 
truth72 and has framed it as a positive obligation to inform victims and others about 
what has taken place in the context of  human rights violations.73 The European Court 
of  Human Rights (ECtHR) also emphasizes that the right belongs to victims, their 
next of  kin and the general public.74 The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights places the right to truth as an aspect of  the right to an effective remedy, which 
is enshrined within the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.75
67 These include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, 993 UNTS 3, 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171; Geneva Conventions 
1949, 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Conflicts 1977, 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol II Additional 
to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of  Victims of  Non-
International Armed Conflicts 1977, 1125 UNTS 609; International Convention for the Protection of  
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, Doc. A/RES/61/177, 20 December 2006, Art. 24, para. 2, 
which sets out the right of  victims to know the truth regarding the circumstances of  the enforced disap-
pearance, the progress and results of  the investigation and the fate of  the disappeared person and state 
party obligations to take appropriate measures in this regard. The convention’s preamble reaffirms the 
right to freedom to seek, receive and impart information to that end.
68 UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), Right to Truth, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/9/11, 18 September 2008, 
para. 1; UNHRC, Right to Truth, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/12, 1 October 2009, para. 1.
69 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNCHR), Study on the Right to the Truth: Report 
of  the Office of  the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/91, 8 
February 2006; UNHRC, Right to the Truth, Report of  the Office of  the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/5/7, 7 June 2007 (both documents with further references contained therein).
70 See, e.g., UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of  the Committee against Torture, 
Colombia, UN Doc. CAT/C/COL/CO/4, 4 May 2010, para. 27.
71 UNHRC, Report of  the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, UN Doc. A/
HRC/16/48, 26 January 2011, para. 39; UNHRC, Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/
HRC/22/52, 1 March 2013, paras 23–26, 32–34; UNHRC, Report of  the Special Rapporteur on Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/3/Add.3, 1 
October 2007, para. 82; UNHRC, Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of  
the Right to Freedom of  Opinion and Expression, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/23, 20 April 2010, para. 34.
72 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACommHR), Annual Report, 1985–86, Doc. OEA/
Ser.L/V/II.68, Doc. 8 rev. 1, 26 September 1986, at 193.
73 IACtHR, Myrna Mack Chang v. Guatemala, Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 25 November 2013, 
para. 274.
74 ECtHR, El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia, Appl. no. 39630/09, Judgment of  13 December 
2012, para. 191, the Court emphasizes ‘the great importance of  the present case not only for the appli-
cant and his family, but also for other victims of  similar crimes and the general public, who had the right 
to know what had happened’.
75 Principle C(b)(3) of  the Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in 
Africa (2003) highlight that the right to an effective remedy includes ‘access to the factual information 
concerning the violations’. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 1981, 1520 UNTS 217.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ejil/article-abstract/29/3/961/5165638 by university of reading user on 15 February 2019
980 EJIL 29 (2018), 961–985
The right to truth entitles the victim, their families and the general public to seek 
and obtain all relevant information about an alleged violation.76 Such informa-
tion might include the whereabouts of  the victim,77 how the violation was officially 
authorized78 and the facts and context of  the violation. The UN Special Rapporteur 
on Promotion of  Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of  Non-Recurrence has 
emphasized that to fulfil the right to truth institutions, mechanisms and procedures 
must be established to enable truth to be revealed, ‘which is seen as a process to seek 
information and facts about what has actually taken place, to contribute to the fight 
against impunity, to the reinstatement of  the rule of  law, and ultimately to recon-
ciliation’.79 The right to truth necessarily entails a victim-centred approach to justice, 
which includes meaningful participation in, and access to, the process. As the special 
rapporteur has emphasized:
[p]rosecutions, for their part, can only serve as actual justice measures if  the victims and their 
families are effectively involved in the processes and provided with the necessary information 
relevant to their participation in proceedings. Local or traditional methods of  rendering justice, 
when compliant with international fair trial guarantees, can reach out to the local population 
so they recognize them as ‘justice’.80
Highlighting the role of  victims and civil society, the special rapporteur takes a holis-
tic approach to justice and to the design and implementation of  that process. He also 
stresses the need for institutional and personnel reform in order to guarantee non-
recurrence, which is a crucial aspect of  justice. Within the comprehensive approach 
that he has set out, there is particular emphasis on the centrality of  victims not only 
in relation to participation in criminal justice procedures but also in relation to the 
visibility of  victims and recognition of  harms caused.81
3 Human Rights
IHRL mechanisms have been utilized by the UN to hold accountable state actors 
through complaints mechanisms within UN treaty bodies and through political meth-
ods at the UN Human Rights Council, among others. The UN has also set up bodies to 
examine human rights violations in peacekeeping operations where the mission has 
become the sole sovereign power within a country.82 But the question of  whether a 
human rights-based approach can be used in relation to the UN is as yet unanswered. 
76 UNCHR, supra note 69, para. 38.
77 UNHRC, Report of  the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, supra note 71, at 
12–17.
78 GA Res. 60/147, 16 December 2005, annex, para. 24; see also IACommHR, supra note 72, at 193; 
Myrna Mack Chang, supra note 73, para. 274; El-Masri, supra note 74, para. 192.
79 UNHRC, Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of  Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees 
of  Non-Recurrence, UN Doc. A/HRC/24/42, 30 July 2013.
80 UNHRC, Report of  the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of  Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees 
of  Non-Recurrence’, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/46, 9 August 2012, para. 54.
81 Ibid, paras 54–58.
82 E.g., the Human Rights Advisory Panel in Kosovo.
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Such an approach is based on the UN being bound by fundamental rights to access a 
court and a remedy, to truth and to the prohibition against torture.
The right to truth has already been explored in this section, but there are other 
fundamental rights that are also violated by the current laws and practices in relation 
to accountability and peacekeepers. The right to access a court and a remedy is con-
tained within many international instruments and is considered a general principle of  
international law common across all legal systems.83 It is clear that the current laws 
and practices violate that right of  victims, either by the vast majority of  prosecutions 
not occurring or taking place in countries where the victims do not have access to 
those courts or remedies. The prohibition against torture is also violated by the cur-
rent system of  laws and practices. Rape and sexual violence may constitute a human 
rights abuse in one of  three ways: (i) if  the rape or sexual violence was committed by a 
state agent with the explicit or tacit approval of  the state (that is, with impunity); (ii) if  
the rape or sexual violence was committed by a private actor who then had impunity 
because the state failed to enact or implement effective criminal laws on those crimes 
or (iii) if  state failures to investigate or prosecute amount to a violation of  a victim’s 
right to access a court and/or remedy and to truth.84 When the UN is operating as a 
pseudo-state, then it will be liable for human rights abuses resulting from the impu-
nity within which sexual abuse occurs if  it is bound by IHRL. The prohibition of  sexual 
abuse exists within UN policies and agreements, but the failures to implement those 
are akin to states failing to implement domestic laws on sexual abuse – thus, amount-
ing to torture if  the UN fails to implement those policies and thus protect individuals 
from such abuse.85
The question that must be addressed, then, is whether the UN is bound by IHRL. The 
starting point is that other international organizations are viewed as being bound by 
IHRL. The ECtHR has made clear that international organizations may be bound by 
IHRL, although these cases are not at all concerned with activities related to peace-
keeping.86 Similarly, other international organizations have adopted similar positions 
to the ECtHR.87 Clearly, there is some movement towards international organizations’ 
immunity being restricted for human rights reasons, mainly where there is no alter-
native or effective dispute settlement mechanism. Some scholars have insisted that 
this approach ‘must be approved’ under a right-based approach.88
83 Statute of  the International Court of  Justice 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, Art. 38.
84 Gaer, ‘Rape as a Form of  Torture: The Experience of  the Committee against Torture’, 15 City University of  
New York Law Review (2011) 293.
85 For further discussion on states’ duties and obligations to prevent and protect, see UN Committee Against 
Torture (CAT), General Comment No. 2: Implementation of  Article 2 by States Parties, Doc. CAT/C/GC/2, 
24 January 2008.
86 ECtHR, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Appl. no. 26083/94, Judgment of  18 February 1999; ECtHR, Beer 
and Reagan v. Germany, Appl. no. 28934/95, Judgment of  18 February 1999.
87 International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal, Chadsey v. Universal Postal Union, Judgment 
no. 122, 15 October 1969, at 176; UN Administrative Tribunal, Teixera v. Secretary-General of  the United 
Nations, Judgment no. 230, 14 October 1977.
88 Paust, supra note 52; Wouters and Schmidt, supra note 50.
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National courts have considered the incompatibility between IHRL and the doc-
trine of  absolute immunity in terms of  international organizations and, specifically, 
the UN.89 The first such case, Manderlier v. Organisation des Nations Unies et l’Etat Belge, 
laid foundations for a potential human rights-based challenge to UN immunity.90 The 
Appeals Court criticized ‘the present state of  international institutions [being that] 
there is no court to which the appellant can submit his dispute with the United Nations’ 
as being a situation that ‘does not seem to be in keeping with the principles proclaimed 
in the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights’.91 While the Court ultimately upheld 
the UN’s absolute immunity, the case highlights the tension between absolute immu-
nity and human rights. It is important to note that this case was brought at a time 
when IHRL was being codified. Over 40 years later, there is greater potential for chal-
lenging immunities on the basis of  the developed rights.
More recent cases demonstrate that the door is ajar for a human rights-based chal-
lenge to the UN immunity laws and frameworks.92 Each of  these cases was decided on 
its own facts, with the courts finding that there were alternative modes of  settlement 
available to the claimants. The courts, however, did set out the principle that a human 
rights-based challenge might be successful if  the organization’s immunity violates an 
individual’s human rights. Jan Wouters and Pierre Schmitt assert that the question 
that arises ‘is not so much a conflict between internal and international rules, but 
rather between international rules inter se’.93 If  a national court were to allow the 
claims to be brought against the UN, it would breach its obligations towards the UN. 
However, it may be ‘permissible justification’ if  the court were ‘to argue that the right’ 
that has been violated ‘may be considered as jus cogens’ (of  such a fundamental nature 
that there can be no limitations of  or derogations from these rights). Holding that the 
rights to access a court or to a remedy are jus cogens would enable a national court to 
uphold a challenge to the UN’s immunity without breaching its own obligations.94
Rosa Freedman insists that when the UN is acting as a sovereign or hybrid sovereign 
power it ought to be treated like a state; therefore, the UN ought to be able to be held 
accountable if  it violates human rights in those circumstances.95 Hovell takes a differ-
ent approach, arguing that due process rather than human rights ought to be central 
to how the UN is treated, but she largely reaches the same conclusions regarding the 
89 Reinisch, ‘The Immunity of  International Organizations and the Jurisdiction of  Their Administrative 
Tribunals’, 7 Chinese Journal of  International Law (2008) 285.
90 Brussels Civil Tribunal, Manderlier v. Organisation des Nations Unies et l’Etat Belge (Ministre des Affaires 
Etrangeres), 11 May 1966, reprinted in Journal des Tribunaux (1966) 721.
91 Brussels Appeal Court, Manderlier v. Belgium State and United Nations, [1969] 69 ILR 139, reprinted in 
[1969] United Nations Juridical Yearbook 236.
92 Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497, 1500 (DC Cir. 1985); District Court of  the Hague, Mothers of  
Srebrenica et al. v. State of  the Netherlands and the UN, Case no. 295247/HA ZA 07-2973, 10 July 2008; 
Appeal Court of  the Hague, Mothers of  Srebrenica v. Netherlands & United Nations, Case no. 200.20.151/01, 
30 March 2010.
93 Wouters and Schmidt, supra note 50.
94 See, e.g., Bianchi, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of  Jus Cogens’, 19(3) EJIL (2008) 491.
95 Freedman, supra note 2.
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end result.96 Indeed, Devika Hovell’s thesis is that there is currently insufficient theo-
retical underpinnings to inform the ad hoc practice on UN accountability and that 
without that theoretical framework there will be no consistency for victims. That lack 
of  uniformity is all too clear when it comes to peacekeeping and accountability.
The UN has taken some steps towards embedding human rights across peacekeeping 
activities generally. While these are not directly focused on accountability, they dem-
onstrate UN recognition of  the need to foreground human rights in peacekeeping. The 
UN Human Rights Up Front Action Plan emphasizes the need to adopt a rights-based 
approach to all UN activities and requires a focal point within every UN department 
and agency.97 Small steps are being taken towards implementing this action plan, but 
it is hampered by current accountability laws that lead to a culture of  impunity within 
which serious crimes are committed followed by an ongoing denial of  victims’ rights. 
The tension between those incremental steps towards implementing human rights 
obligations and the current laws on accountability once again highlight the need for a 
new, holistic, victim-centred approach to immunities and jurisdictional bars.
4 Political Processes
Accountability may also occur through political processes that encourage, or even 
coerce, states to uphold their obligations to investigate and prosecute crimes of  sexual 
abuse. Despite some commentators insisting that political processes cannot be relied 
upon to ensure accountability, it is clear that such processes have a significant role to 
play.98 While politics cannot fulfil the role of  law, political processes often are deployed 
to ensure that states implement international laws in the international arena. To do 
so, the political cost of  not upholding legal obligations must outweigh any costs to the 
state of  fulfilling their obligations. Of  course, political processes are far from sufficient 
on their own to address the problem. Yet they play a vital role and must be considered 
in any discussions about a holistic approach to accountability.
Over recent years, the UN has deployed a range of  political processes aimed at 
encouraging states to investigate and prosecute peacekeepers for crimes of  sexual 
abuse. Steps forward such as ‘naming and shaming’ states that fail to comply with 
their obligations as well as repatriating contingents where sexual abuse is rife have 
contributed to the improved investigation and prosecution of  sexual crimes. However, 
there is scope for further efforts in this regard. Political processes could be deployed 
to ensure that internationally accepted definitions and standards of  sexual abuse are 
agreed within the international arena and then are used for international peacekeep-
ers. Such a move would circumvent the need for a new convention, a proposal that has 
been mooted but that is unlikely to be accepted by states.99 Similarly, politics could be 
96 Hovell, ‘Due Process in the United Nations’, 110(1) AJIL (2016) 9.
97 Gilmour, ‘The Future of  Human Rights: A View from the United Nations’, 28(2) Ethics and International 
Affairs (2014) 239. UN Human Rights Up Front Action Plan, supra note 3.
98 See, e.g., Code Blue Campaign, available at www.codebluecampaign.com/.
99 Deen-Racsmány, ‘Towards a Convention on the Criminal Accountability of  UN Personnel Including UN 
Military Experts on Mission and UN Police Officers’, 54(2) Military Law and the Law of  War (2015–2016) 
195.
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used to ensure that other legal gaps and flaws are addressed – for example, by not allow-
ing countries to contribute troops or for nationals to apply for UN positions unless or 
until there are national laws enabling extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction for sexual 
abuse. Political processes have also been used to encourage the UN to comply with its 
obligations. Advocacy and lobbying efforts by civil society has placed significant pres-
sure on the UN and member states to address failures within the organization. As a 
result, independent reviews and panels have been appointed that have recommended 
stronger policies, improved compliance and greater transparency. This work, in turn, 
has led to significant improvements in UN compliance with its obligations.
4 Conclusions on a New Approach to Accountability
It is clear that a new approach to accountability for UN peacekeepers is required and 
that there ought to be holistic reform by placing victims at the heart of  the system. 
Precisely what that reform looks like, however, remains unclear. There are many 
proposals currently being presented, ranging from ensuring the  implementation 
of  existing laws, reforming those laws ad hoc or wholesale, creating new justice 
mechanisms, designing new policies or effecting new prevention strategies. What has 
not been discussed is what accountability looks like and who needs to be accountable 
to whom and in what manner. In order to have a holistic discussion about the methods 
for accountability, we must first address what accountability is and the different forms 
it might take within the context of  UN peacekeeping. This brief, concluding section is 
not designed to answer those questions in full but, rather, to raise the issues that must 
be taken forward by all those concerned with this matter.
As explained, accountability is usually understood to refer to a relationship whereby 
an individual, group or entity demands that an agent report their activities and has the 
ability to impose sanctions on that agent. There are many different forms that account-
ability relationships take and many different methods by which such accountability 
occurs. While many people and societies view accountability mechanisms and prac-
tices as something that involves legal processes, mechanisms and sanctions, that is 
only one aspect of  the range of  ways in which accountability occurs around the world. 
Courts and quasi-judicial bodies are one method for holding a person or an entity 
to account, but in some contexts or societies, these would be wholly inappropriate. 
Although a victim plays a role and has her rights upheld within legal mechanisms, the 
focus remains on the perpetrator. Truth commissions and public enquiries are another 
method by which accountability occurs. In such bodies, the focus is on the victims and 
their communities, with the perpetrator playing a role in the gathering and exposing of  
the truth in order to present it to the victims. Accountability may also occur through 
remedies or through mitigating harms and consequences of  an action, whether to the 
victim or to her family or community. Institutional accountability may take the form 
of  reviewing and revising policies and practices to improve future conduct. Of  course, 
there are many other methods for ensuring accountability that are context specific 
and that meet the needs of  the person or entity to which the accountability is owed. 
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It is precisely because of  this broad range of  options, and the many different actors 
involved, that accountability in relation to UN peacekeepers must be viewed holistically 
and go beyond traditional calls solely for criminal law processes.
Accountability also operates in different ways depending on the scale at which that 
accountability takes place. In relation to sexual abuse and UN peacekeepers, there are 
many actors, and, therefore, accountability will be expected in a range of  different 
ways. At the most basic level, there should be accountability of  the perpetrator to the 
victim, to society and to the criminal law governing his behaviour. Accountability to 
the victim is also required from the justice mechanism that prosecutes the perpetrator, 
with the need for transparency, reporting and remedies where applicable. But the UN 
must also be accountable to the victim through accountability to the host country 
in relation to the steps it has and will take to prevent future harms. Similarly, TCCs 
are accountable to the UN, to host states and to local communities in relation to the 
steps they take to prevent and, where relevant, punish sexual abuse by their troops. All 
of  those converging relationships demonstrate that accountability cannot be imple-
mented solely through the lens of  criminal law, human rights, training and preven-
tion strategies or any other single focus. Instead, a holistic victim-centred approach 
must be adopted to ensure accountability.
By refocusing on the victim rather than on the perpetrator, and by adopting a holis-
tic approach to reform rather than a piecemeal one that looks only at specific flaws 
or gaps, the foundations are set for a new approach to the issue of  sexual abuse and 
UN peacekeepers. There is not necessarily a need to design new laws, new policies or 
new mechanisms but, rather, a need to work with what already exists and to harness, 
streamline and enhance those laws, policies and practices. To do so successfully, the 
victim must be placed at the centre of  those existing processes and frameworks, and 
any gaps in the system must be addressed. There is a significant opportunity to bring 
together the many different perspectives on how to address this problem and to tackle 
it in a manner that will provide lasting and effective reform.
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